Motivated by theoretical and practical interest, the challenging task of designing cryptographic protocols having only black-box access to primitives has generated various breakthroughs in the last decade. Despite such positive results, even though nowadays we know black-box constructions for secure two-party and multi-party computation even in constant rounds, there still are in Cryptography several constructions that critically require non-black-box use of primitives in order to securely realize some fundamental tasks. As such, the study of the gap between black-box and nonblack-box constructions still includes major open questions.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question in Cryptography of both theoretical and practical interest is whether a task can be securely realized by using primitives only in a black-box (BB) way. The question is of interest for theoreticians because, despite recent advances, there still are several fundamental tasks (e.g., CCA encryption, non-interactive zero-knowledge) that so far have been realized only by critically using in a nonblack-box (NBB) fashion some underlying primitives. For such tasks it is still unknown whether BB constructions are possible at all. Moreover, recently proposed BB constructions include ingenious and elegant techniques that make the study of the above gap fascinating and challenging. The question is also of practical interest since BB constructions avoid NP reductions involving circuits of primitives. Such reductions are often very expensive and categorize the NBB constructions as mere feasibility results. Another advantage of BB constructions is that one can instantiate the underlying primitive with an arbitrary implementation, for example even with a physical implementation (i.e., hardware tokens). 30 ], the case of interactive protocols remained obscure until some recent breakthroughs.
In [23] , Ishai et al. showed the first BB construction for oblivious transfer (OT) and then for multi-party computation (MPC), by pairing their result with the one of Kilian [26] . Later on in [19] , Haitner showed how to get oblivious transfer through BB calls to semi-honest oblivious transfer, therefore improving on the generality of the underlying primitives.
Even though the existence of BB constructions for MPC might look like the end of the story, the state of affairs is instead much more complicated. Indeed, things change completely when fundamental properties of cryptographic protocols (e.g., round complexity, security in a concurrent setting, complexity of the players, underlying assumptions) are taken into account. Constant-round constructions were considered in [35] , where Pass and Wee showed BB constructions based on OWFs for various building blocks such as trapdoor commitments, coin tossing and zero-knowledge (ZK) arguments of knowledge. The above building blocks combined with previous work produced the first constant-round constructions for two-party computation starting from any constant-round semi-honest OT protocol. In [9] , Choi et al. showed how to obtain similar results w.r.t. adaptive adversaries. In [37] , Wee showed the first BB constructions with sub-linear round complexity for MPC, and later on Goyal in [17] obtained constant-round constructions based on the BB use of any OWF. In [18] the BB use of OWFs has been shown to be sufficient to construct constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitments. Other BB constructions for commitment schemes have been considered w.r.t. selective opening attacks in [38, 33] . In [28] Lin and Pass showed the first BB construction for MPC in the standard model that satisfies a non-trivial form of concurrent security and requires a non-constant number of rounds. Very recently, Kiyoshima et al. in [21] improved on the round complexity providing a constant-round construction for the same result.
The tough case of hiding the input size.
While the above results are encouraging towards avoiding NBB constructions, all the known techniques fail spectacularly when a cryptographic task aims at hiding the size of the input used during the computation. Such a requirement is for instance critical in constructions of witness indistinguishable universal arguments [4] (WIUARGs) and in turn in the breakthrough of Barak [3] that shows how to get constant-round public-coin ZK, by means of new NBB simulation technique.
Input-size hiding constructions typically rely on the use of Merkle trees 1 to succinctly commit to an a priori unbounded number of elements, and to later reveal only selected elements. The key requirement is that in order to protect the size of the input, the length of a path between the root and a leaf of the tree must remain hidden. This requirement invalidates any straightforward black-box solution based on combining a CR hash function and a black-box commitment scheme, as it would require to unfold a path and therefore reveal the size of the tree.
Difficulties on achieving BB input-size hiding protocols become more evident when even more sophisticated known techniques fail. The reason is again that they crucially reveal the size of the input. Consider for instance one of the most powerful techniques developed so far, namely: the "MPC in the head" paradigm of Ishai et al. [24] , subsequently extended in [18] . The use of this technique would require the virtual execution of an n-party protocol where players perform a computation over the committed input. It can be trivially observed by using information-theoretic arguments that since when implementing this paradigm some views of those virtual players are shown to the verifier, the size of the views of those player would reveal the size of the input. In a concurrent and independent work, Ishai and Weiss [25] show a commit-and-prove scheme based on the MPC-in-the head technique that is succinct and makes only BB use of a hash function. Their construction is not size-hiding: their techniques crucially rely on the fact that the size of the input is known to all players.
This leads us to the first question. "Is it possible to have BB constructions of input-size hiding proofs"?
The Black-box non-black-box question.
The NBB simulation paradigm of Barak has significantly influenced the landscape of cryptographic protocols as it yields results that are impossible via BB simulation (e.g., constant-round public-coin ZK). Despite being very influential, the downside is the established folklore that protocols proved secure through NBB simulation must be inefficient. This is in part due to the heavy NBB usage of cryptographic primitives. Does this mean that the constructions of Barak along with all other subsequent similar constructions would forever remain only in papers and can not move towards being realized in practice? If indeed this is true, it would be quite unfortunate. Getting a BB construction of a cryptographic protocol is generally considered to be the "first step" towards understanding how efficiently it can be implemented in practice.
This leads us to the second question. "Is it possible to have NBB simulation even without the protocol making NBB use of cryptographic primitives?", and therefore, "is there a BB construction for constant-round public-coin ZK?"
We remark that recent results based on non-black-box simulation techniques [8, 13, 10, 11] managed to obtain some important results on security under reset attacks without relying on Barak's approach, but their constructions are not public coin.
Our Results and Techniques
In this work we solve the above open problems by introducing new techniques that allow us to build BB constructions of input-size hiding proofs. Such proofs do not reveal anything about the size of the witnesses and use cryptographic primitives in a BB manner. We construct a BB size-hiding commit-and-prove protocol that we use to implement the first BB construction of a WIUARG and of a constant-round public-coin ZK.
We now describe our results in greater details.
Black-Box input-size hiding commit-and-prove.
We put forth the notion of a black-box input-size hiding commit-and-prove protocol, in which there is a prover P that commits to an arbitrarily long string, and later proves a predicate about this string so that: 1) both the commitment and the proof are succinct and hide the input size (note that a proof can be succinct but not size-hiding, e.g., UARG of [27] ); 2) the primitives are accessed in a BB manner.
Constructing a succinct BB commitment can be easily done via a Merkle tree. A Merkle tree is built by arranging the bits of the string on the leaves of a binary tree, and computing each internal node as the hash of the children. The root of such tree is of fixed size, independent of the size of the tree. The commitment then is simply a BB commitment of the root.
Achieving succinct and size-hiding BB proofs is instead much more problematic. The crucial problem is to use the hash function in a BB manner while guaranteeing input-size hiding. To see why, consider a prover who wants to prove a predicate about a bit of the committed string (hence, about a leaf of the Merkle tree). Soundness demands that first the prover proves that the leaf is consistent with the committed root. Consistency means that there exists a path from the leaf to the committed root, and each node along the path corresponds to the hash of its children. How to prove to the verifier that a path is consistent, without using the code of the hash function? The only way we can think of doing this, is by exhibiting a path and letting the verifier check the hash consistency of each node in such path. Neglecting for a moment how to reveal a path while keeping the values of the nodes along the path secret (which is only slightly less challenging), the main problem here is that the length of the path itself reveals the size of the string! Using an upper-bound on the size of the tree is not a solution, as in order to enable the prover to commit to any polynomially long string, such upper bound should be super-polynomial.
We solve the problem by introducing extendable Merkle trees, in which the prover can extend any real path to an arbitrary long imaginary path, on-the-fly. The main idea behind our extendable Merkle tree is a new representation of the nodes. In our tree each node is represented as an execution of MPC-in-the-head [24] ; namely each node will be a vector of views of imaginary MPC players. Using such representation, the prover will be able to open paths of the Merkle tree and let the verifier check the hash consistency, by opening only some of the views for each node. This allows the BB use of the hash function while preserving hiding of the nodes. Moreover, the use of MPC-in-the-head will allow an honest prover to cheat when proving the consistency of a path, thus being able to extend any real path when necessary.
For convenience, in the rest of the paper we shall write size-hiding instead of input-size hiding.
Black-box WIUARGs.
Witness Indistinguishable Universal Arguments (for short, WIUARGs) [4] are interactive arguments that allow to prove statements for languages in NTIME(t) (the tuple (M, x, t) ∈ NTIME(t) if M (x) outputs 1 in at most t steps) with the verification time which is polylogarithmic in t. Because the verification must be logarithmic in t, the proof itself must be succinct, namely, logarithmic in the size of the witness of maximum length. We follow the implementation of Barak and Goldreich [4] where a prover commits to a PCP oracle, and after receiving the queries from the verifier, it proves that, had it opened the bits of the oracle selected by the PCP queries, the PCP Verifier would have accepted.
Our BB commit-and-prove protocol directly yields to a black-box constant-round public-coin WIUARG: in the commitment phase, the prover commits to the PCP π; in the proof phase, the verifier provides the positions of π to be checked, and then the prover proves the predicate: "the PCP verifier would have accepted the bits of π selected by the verifier's queries". This result is presented in Sec. 4.1.
Black-box constant-round public-coin ZK.
As a main result of our work, we show a black-box construction for constant-round public-coin ZK, following the ideas proposed by Barak in [3] . Barak's ZK protocol for an NP language L consists of two phases. In the first phase, called the trapdoor generation phase, the prover commits to a trapdoor. The trapdoor is a string which is supposed to be the code of a machine predicting the next message function of the verifier. This trapdoor is used by the non-black-box simulator who knows the code of the malicious verifier. The verifier replies to the commitment with a random string r.
In the second phase, called proof phase, P must prove that: (Theorem 1) either the value committed in the first phase is a Turing Machine M that predicts r in less then |r| log 2 n steps (which happens only with negligible probability without knowledge of the code of V ), or (Theorem 2) x ∈ L. There are two observations about Theorem 1.
First, Theorem 1 is not an NP statement, and as such must be proved using a WIUARG. Second, the theorem itself uses the code of the commitment scheme and of the hash function. The latter observation implies that even the improved implementations of Barak's protocol given in [34] 2 still require both prover and verifier to access the code of the hash function.
As mentioned above, we know how to construct black-box WIUARG that we can use to prove Theorem 1. And, we know how to get a BB version of Theorem 1, by computing the commitment of M using our BB size-hiding commitment stage (via extendable Merkle trees). However, the two tools together are not enough to obtain a size-hiding proof for Theorem 1, for the following reason.
The machine M is the theorem on which a PCP proof π is computed. Although it is true that the PCP verifier can decide to accept a proof by reading only few bits of π, it still needs to read the entire theorem M in order to compute this decision. Therefore the view of a PCP verifier -which will be run in the head of the prover -depends on the size of the theorem being proved, and this immediately invalidates the zero-knowledge property. To solve this problem we use PCPs of Proximity instead of standard PCPs. In a PCP of Proximity the verifier has only oracle access to the theorem, and thus is able to make its decision by looking at few bits of the theorem and few bits of the proof. This result is presented in Sec. 4.2.
Black-box public-coin protocols and the Random Oracle Model.
Our black-box use of a CR hash function allows us to instantiate the hash function with a random oracle (our constructions also use statistically-hiding commitments, but they can be constructed in a BB manner from any CR hash function [32] ). Therefore, in the random oracle model (ROM) [5] we obtain the first information-theoretically secure WIUARG. Applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [15] , we obtain the first non-interactive information-theoretically secure WIUARG in the ROM. Note that CS proofs of [29] are non-interactive UARGs but they are not witness indistinguishable. Similarly, our public-coin ZK protocol can be made non-interactive and information-theoretically secure in the ROM. Interestingly, this seems to be the first example of an information-theoretically secure protocol in the ROM for which the Fiat-Shamir heuristic would fail.
We remark that the soundness of such information-theoretic succinct proofs is still "computational" in the sense that a false proof can exist and can be found by a prover that has unbounded access to the random oracle.
DEFINITIONS
We assume familiarity with interactive arguments and argument of knowledge. We start with the definition of zero knowledge.
Definition 1 (Zero Knowledge
). An interactive protocol (P, V ) for a language L is zero knowledge if for every PPT adversary V * , there exists a PPT simulator S such that the probability ensembles { P, V * (z) (x)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * and {S(x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * are computationally indistinguishable, where P, V * (z) (x) denotes the output of V * when interacting with P on common input x and auxiliary input z.
Universal arguments (UARG).
We recall the definition provided in [4] . Let LU = {(M, x, t): ∃w s.t. ((M, x, t), w) ∈ RU }, where ((M, x, t), w) ∈ RU if M accepts (x, w) within t steps. Let TM (x, w) denote the number of steps made by M on input (x, w). Recall that |(M, x, t)| = O(|M | + |x| + log t); that is, t is given in binary.
Definition 2 (Universal argument [4]).
A universal argument system is an interactive protocol (P, V ) that satisfies the following properties:
• Efficient Verification. There exists a polynomial p such that for any y = (M, x, t), the total time spent by the (probabilistic) verifier strategy V , on the common input y, is at most p(|y|). In particular, all messages exchanged in the protocol have a length smaller than p(|y|).
• Completeness via a relatively efficient prover. For ev-
Furthermore, there exists a polynomial p such that for every ((M, x, t), w) ∈ RU the total time spent by
• Computational Soundness. For every polynomial-size circuit family {P * n }n∈N and (M, x, t) ∈ {0, 1} n \LU :
where ν : N → [0, 1] is a negligible function.
• A weak proof-of-knowledge property. For every positive polynomial p there exists a positive polynomial p and a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine E such that the following holds: for every polynomial-size circuit family {P * n }n∈N and every sufficiently long
where RU (y) = {w : (y, w) ∈ RU } and E P * n r (., .) denotes the function defined by fixing the random tape of E to equal r and providing the resulting Er with oracle access to P * n . The oracle machine E is called a (knowledge) extractor.
Definition 3 (Witness Indistinguishable UARG).
A universal argument [4] (P, V ) is called witness indistinguishable (WI) if, for every polynomial p, every polynomial size circuit family {V * n }n ∈ N, and every three sequences yn = (Mn, xn, tn) : n ∈ N , w 1 n : n ∈ N and w 2 n : n ∈ N such that |yn| = n and tn ≤ p(|xn|) and (yn, w
Probabilistically Checkable Proofs.
Informally, a PCP [2] system for a language L consists of a proof π written in a redundant form for a statement "x ∈ L", and a PPT verifier, which is able to decide the truthfulness of the statement by reading only few bits of the proof.
A PCP verifier V can be decomposed into a pair of algorithms: the query algorithm Qpcp and the decision algorithm Dpcp. Qpcp on input x and random tape r, outputs positions q1 = Qpcp(x, r, 1), . . ., q p(|x|) = Qpcp(x, r, p(|x|)) for some polynomial p. V accepts if Dpcp(x, r, π[q1], . . . , π[q p(|x|) ]) outputs 1.
For later, it is useful to see algorithm Dpcp(·) as a predicate defined over a string π which is tested on few positions.
Probabilistically Checkable Proofs of Proximity.
The standard PCP verifier decides whether to accept the statement "x ∈ L" by probing few bits of the proof π and reading the entire statement x.
A "PCP of proximity" (PCPP) [7] is a relaxation of PCP in which the verifier is able to make a decision without even reading the entire statement, but only few bits of it. More specifically, in a PCPP the theorem is divided in two parts (a, y). A public string a, which is read entirely by the verifier, a private string y, of which the verifier has only oracle access. Consequently, PCPP is defined for pair languages L ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * . For every a ∈ {0, 1} * we denote La = {y ∈ {0, 1} * : (a, y) ∈ L}. The soundness requirement of PCPP is relaxed in the sense that V can only verify that the input is close to an element of the language. The PCP Verifier can be seen as a pair of algorithms (Qpcpx, Dpcpx), where Qpcpx(a, r, i) outputs a pair of positions (qi, pi): qi denotes a position in the theorem y, pi denotes a position in the proof π. Dpcpx decides whether to accept (a, y) by looking at the public theorem a, and at positions y[qi], π [pi] .
For later, it is useful to see algorithm Dpcpx(·) as a predicate defined over two strings y, π, testing few positions of each string.
Definition 4 (PCPP verifier). For functions s, δ :
N → [0, 1], a verifier V is a probabilistically checkable proof of proximity (PCPP) system for a pair language L with proximity parameter δ and soundness error s, if the following two conditions hold for every pair of strings (a, y):
• Completeness: If (a, y) ∈ L then there exists π such that V (a) accepts oracle y • π with probability 1.
• Soundness: If y is δ(|a|)-far from La, then for every π, the verifier V (a) accepts oracle y • π with probability strictly less than s(|a|).
Secure Multiparty Computation.
A secure multi-party computation (MPC) [6, 1] scheme allows n players to jointly and correctly compute an n-ary function based on their private inputs, even in the presence of t corrupted players. [6] shows that for every n-ary function F : ({0, 1} * ) n → ({0, 1} * ) n , there exists a t-secure MPC protocol MPC-F that securely computes F in the semihonest model for any t < n/2, and in the malicious model for any t < n/3, with perfect completeness and security. That is, given the private input wi of player Pi, after running the protocol MPC-F, an honest Pi receives in output the i-th component of the result of the function F applied to the inputs of the players, as long as the adversary corrupts less than t players. In addition, nothing is learnt by the adversary from the execution of MPC-F other than the output.
In an MPC protocol, the view of a player includes all messages received by that player during the execution of the protocol, and the private inputs and the randomness used by the player. The views of two players are consistent if they satisfy the following definition.
Definition 5 (View Consistency). The view of an honest player during an MPC computation contains input and randomness used in the computation, and all messages received/sent from/to the communication tapes. We have that two views (viewi, viewj) are consistent with each other if, (a) both the players Pi and Pj individually computed each outgoing message honestly by using the random tapes, inputs and incoming messages specified in viewi and viewj respectively, and, (b) all output messages of Pi to Pj appearing in viewi are consistent with incoming messages of Pj received from Pi appearing in viewj, and vice versa.
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS).
A verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [12] scheme is a twostage secret sharing protocol for implementing the following functionality. In the first stage, denoted by Share(s), a special player referred to as dealer, shares a secret s among n players, in the presence of at most t corrupted players. In the second stage, denoted by Recon, players exchange their views of the share stage, and reconstruct the value s. We use notation Recon(P VSS i , . . . , P VSS n ) to refer to this procedure. The functionality ensures that when the dealer is honest, before the second stage begins, the t corrupted players have no information about the secret. Moreover, when the dealer is dishonest, at the end of the share phase the honest players would have realized it through an accusation mechanism that disqualifies the dealer.
(a) A node in the Merkle Tree. A VSS scheme can tolerate errors on malicious dealer and players on distributing inconsistent or incorrect shares, indeed the critical property is that even in case the dealer is dishonest but has not been disqualified, still the second stage always reconstructs the same string among the honest players. In this paper, we use a (n, t)-perfectly secure VSS scheme with a deterministic reconstruction procedure [16] .
MPC-in-the-head.
MPC-in-the-head is a breakthrough technique introduced by Ishai at al. in [24] to construct a BB zero-knowledge protocol. Let FZK be the zero-knowledge functionality for an NP language L, that takes as public input x and one share from each player Pi, and outputs 1 iff the secret reconstructed from the shares is a valid witness. Let MPC-ZK be a perfect t-secure MPC protocol implementing FZK .
Very roughly, the "MPC-in-the-head" idea is the following. The prover runs in his head an execution of MPC-ZK among n imaginary players, each one participating in the protocol with a share of the witness. Then it commits to the view of each player separately. The verifier obtains t randomly chosen views, and checks that such views are consistent (according to Def. 5) and accepts if the output of every player is 1. Clearly P * decides the randomness and the input of each player so it can cheat at any point and make players output 1. However, the crucial observation is that in order to do so, it must be the case that a constant fraction of the views committed are not consistent. Thus by selecting the t views at random, V will catch inconsistent views whp.
One can extend this technique further (as in [18] ), to prove a general predicate φ about arbitrary values. Namely, one can consider the functionality F φ in which every player i participates with an input that is a view of a VSS player P VSS i . F φ collects all such views, and outputs 1 if and only if φ(Recon(P VSS 1 , . . . , P VSS n )) = 1. We crucially use this idea in our constructions.
We now define the primitive size-hiding BB commit-andprove. This is a two-stage functionality parameterized by an upper bound d = n log n on the string size, which captures any polynomially long string. In the first stage, the prover P commits to a string s. In the second stage, called proof stage, the verifier V challenges P with a set of positions I in the range [d] and P proves that a predicate φ is satisfied in those positions. Because the real size of the string is unknown to V , V will choose one set of positions for each possible size: I1, . . . , I d , with d = log d.
The soundness requirement is that V accepts the proof iff φ is satisfied in the set of position I log |s| where s is the unique string committed in the first stage. The privacy requirement is defined via the witness indistinguishability property: for every predicate φ, for every pair of strings w0, w1 of possibly different sizes which satisfy φ, at the end of the proof phase, any malicious verifier cannot distinguish which of the two strings was committed.
For simplicity of explanation, in the following we assume that V queries a single position qj, instead of a set of positions Ij, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , d }.
Warm-Up: A Non-Black-Box Protocol
Achieving a black-box construction for the above primitive requires several ideas and techniques. We start by showing a non-black-box construction which explains the rationale behind the final protocol. Then we show how to make this protocol black-box.
Merkle tree.
Merkle trees are used to succinctly commit to an arbitrarily long string and to later selectively open single bits of the string. Given a string s and a CR hash function h : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n , let s = log(|s|). The Merkle tree is a binary tree constructed as follows.
• A leaf l γ is set as the γ-th bit of s, where γ ∈ {0, 1} s .
• An internal node l γ is set as h(l γ0 ||l γ1 ), where γ ∈ ∪ i=0 i= s −1 {0, 1} i . We denote by l λ the root of the tree.
We shall refer to l γ as the label of the node. Commitment. The commitment of s is the root of the tree. Opening. To reveal a bit in position γ ∈ {0, 1} s , the prover sends sγ together with an authentication path consisting of the nodes from the leaf γ to the root, and their siblings. Formally, for a leaf γ ∈ {0, 1} s , the authentication path consists of the labels path γ = ((l 0 , l 1 ),
; where γ1, . . . , γ s is the bit expansion of index γ. Verification. V accepts sγ if for any
. We start by showing a straightforward commit-and-prove protocol based on Merkle trees which is succinct, but is not size-hiding and uses commitment and hash in a non-blackbox manner.
• Commitment. P constructs the Merkle tree for a string s ∈ {0, 1} * . P sends the root l λ and the depth of the tree s to V .
• V sends predicate φ to be proved, and the index q ∈ {0, 1} s .
• Proof. On input φ, q, P sends commitment of the authentication path for sq, namely cp = com(path q ).
Then it proves in zero-knowledge that: 1) (path consistency) the path committed in cp is consistent with l λ and opens to a value sq. Namely, there exists a valid opening of the commitment cp to a path path q for a leaf l q that is consistent with the root l λ under the hash function h. This proof uses the code com and h. 2) (predicate) φ(l q ) = 1.
Size-hiding NBB commit-and-prove.
In the above construction P reveals the size s of the committed string. s is used by V to compute the index q on which the predicate should be evaluated. We now show a construction that is also size-hiding. Recall that the sizehiding construction works with the upper bound d = n log n , and that d = log d.
The first change is that now the verifier will query an index q for each possible level of the tree representing the string: q1, . . . , q d . Consequently, the prover is expected to provide a path for each query qj. However, the prover has built a real tree of depth s, and does not know how to open consistent paths which are longer than s (note that P cannot build a tree of depth d as it would be of exponential size). Additionally, for any j = s, the prover cannot prove that the predicate φ is true.
The observation here is that the prover is not really required to do so. The only thing we require from the prover is to provide a consistent path for the query q s (the only query that hits the real depth) and that φ(sq s ) = 1. For any other query qj, with j = s, the prover should not give any proof.
This turns out to be very easy to achieve using the code of commitment and hash function in the proof. The idea is to use the depth of the real tree as a trapdoor, and allow the prover to cheat when answering to any query outside the real depth.
Thus, we require P to commit to the depth s of the real tree already in the commitment phase. This binds P to a tree of depth s and enables P to prove only predicates about leaves lying at level s. In the proof phase, P answers to each query that does not hit the real tree by computing a fake path and then computing the ZK proof using as witness the trapdoor, that is, the depth of the tree. More in detail, the size-hiding NBB commit-and-prove is the following.
• Commitment. P constructs the Merkle tree for a string s ∈ {0, 1} * . P sends cr = l λ and cd = com( s) to V .
• Challenge. V sends predicate φ to be proved, and indexes q1, . . . , q d with qj ∈ {0, 1} j and j = 1, . . . , d .
• Proof. (Commitment of paths) For j = s, P set path q j to be all zeros and cp q j = com(path q j ). For q s , P sets path q s to be the real path from a leaf labelled as l q s to the root committed in cr. (Proof of consistency) For any j, P proves in ZK that either 1) cp q j is the commitment of a path from leaf l q j consistent to the root committed in cr, under hash function h and j = s and φ(l q j ) = 1, or 2) j = s.
The NBB use of the primitives allows to cheat straightforwardly: for the queries that are not hitting the real tree, the prover can just make up fake paths and use the trapdoor condition to compute the ZK proof. In fact, the prover is doing all the checks in his head, using the code of the primitives. The verifier only sees commitments and ZK proofs therefore cannot distinguish which is the real path.
The difficulty comes when the prover cannot prove statements about committed values and hashed values using the code of such primitives. In particular, how can P prove the consistency of the path with the root without using the code of the hash function?
Our Black-Box Protocol
The main difficulty when moving to a BB construction is how to prove consistency of a path without revealing any information about the real tree, and without using the code of the hash function and the commitment scheme.
In order to use the hash function in a BB manner, the prover should unfold each path and let the verifier check its consistency by directly applying the hash function. This is clearly problematic for two reasons: 1) for any query lying beyond the real tree, the prover has not constructed any path, hence for such queries the consistency check always fails, thus revealing the size of the real tree; 2) the prover should reveal a path without revealing the values of the nodes. This might require the prover to work with committed values, therefore requiring the ZK proof to use the code of the commitment.
We solve both issues using the following key ideas.
Value representation.
We represent any value v involved in the proof (e.g., a node, the depth of the real tree) in a redundant manner, namely, as a vector of views of VSS players. More specifically, let v be any string that P will use in the proof. Instead of working directly with v, P will execute (in his head) a VSS protocol among n + 1 players in which the dealer shares the string v. The result of this process is a vector of n views of VSS players, with the property that (n − t) views allow the reconstruction of value v, but any subset of only t views does not reveal anything about v. We call this vector of views as the VSS representation of v.
Definition 6 (VSS representation).
The VSS representation of a string s ∈ {0, 1} * , is the vector VSS = [P VSS 1 , . . ., P VSS n ], where P VSS i is the view of player i, participating in the protocol Share(s). In the paper we use VSS γ to denote the VSS representation of a node γ, or VSS string to denote the VSS representation of the string string.
Following this approach, the prover computes the Merkle tree by "extending" each label with its VSS representation.
In our tree, a node in position γ is now a pair [l γ , VSS γ ], where VSS γ is the vector of n views of VSS players which are secret sharing l γ . We shall refer to l γ as the label part of a node, and to VSS γ as the VSS part. Each node [l γ , VSS γ ] satisfies the condition that that Recon(VSS γ ) = l γ . We call this constraint the "innode property". Similarly, the value representing the depth of the real tree is replaced with its VSS representation, that we denote by VSS depth . The VSS representation allows us to prove the consistency of a path and the validity of the predicate using hash and commitment in a BB manner, for the following reasons. First, the t-privacy of VSS allows P to reveal up to t views of the VSS part of each node, while still preserving the hiding of the label. Looking ahead, this enables V to check the hash consistency between a parent node and its children, by directly applying the hash function to the VSS views of the children (we explain this more formally later), hence using the hash function in a BB manner. Second, this representation allows us to prove any predicate about the value reconstructed by the VSS views using MPC-inthe-head: due to the t-correctness of VSS and the MPC protocol used, the verifier is convinced about the validity of the proof by looking at only t views of the VSS and the MPC. More specifically, assume P wants to prove a predicate φ about a value v, and let VSS = [P VSS 1 , . . . , P VSS n ] be the VSS representation of v. P can run an MPC-in-the-head for a functionality F φ played among n players. A player Pi gives in input a view P VSS i , F φ reconstructs the value v from such views, and outputs 1 to all players iff φ(v) = 1. The output of this process is again a vector of n views. Later, V will probe t views of the MPC and VSS, and is convinced if the views are consistent and the output in every revealed view is 1.
Node connection.
In a standard Merkle tree, the label of a node is computed as the hash of the labels of the children. We connect the nodes differently. In our tree, the label of a parent node is computed as the hash of only the VSS part of the children, discarding the label part. The innode property guarantees that the label of the parent is still virtually connected to the label part of the children (see Fig. 1 ). This virtual connection introduces a soft link between labels, that can be broken when necessary.
then the label for node γ is the vector:
. Note that each VSS view is hashed separately.
As there is no direct connection between labels l γ , l γ0 , l γ1 , the consistency of a link in a tree is conditioned on the fact that a node is consistent, that is, [l γb , VSS γb ] satisfies the innode property, for b = 0, 1.
Two key observations follow. First, the innode condition is crucial for the tree to be binding. If the innode condition is not enforced, then P can replace the label of a node with a string which is the root of some freshly generated path. Second, the innode condition cannot be checked directly by V , as it would require V to see more than t views and reconstruct the value of each node. Instead, it is proved by P via MPC-in-the-head. Looking ahead, in this MPC, P will prove that either the innode condition holds, or the node is on a path of a query which is outside the real depth. For this proof P will need the VSS part of a node and the VSS representation of the depth of the real tree.
As we shall see later, these two facts together enable the prover to compute fake paths for the queries outside the real tree. Summing up, for each level of our Merkle tree we have a two-tier connection. A hard connection between a parent label and the children: each label l γ is the concatenation of the hash values of VSS γ0 , VSS γ1 . This connection is checked directly by V applying hash function upon t views revealed (hash consistency). A soft connection, within a node [l γ , VSS γ ] (node consistency). This is checked indirectly by the prover using MPC-in-the-head on top of VSS γ Commitment Stage: BBCom(·) Input to P : String s ∈ {0, 1} * . Let s = log |s| V sends h to P . P builds the extendable Merkle tree for s.
• Leaf: the leaf in position γ ∈ {0, 1} s is the pair: [l γ , VSS γ ]. Where l γ = sγ and
• Internal Node:
n )] and VSS γ = Share(l γ ).
• Root: the label of the root is
P runs Share( s) and obtains [P depth 1
, . . . , P
depth n ].
P commits to the root and to the depth of the real tree sending:
), for i = 1, . . . , n.
P sendsC λ , C 1 , . . . , Cn to V . depth . P runs an MPC protocol for the functionality F innode that takes as input from each player i, the ith view of VSS γ , and VSS depth and the i-th and (i + n)-th hash values from l γ , and outputs 1 to every player iff, either Recon(VSS γ ) = l γ or γ > Recon(VSS depth ). We denote this protocol by MPC-in. Fig. 2 illustrates how our new Merkle tree is built, and the commitment stage of our protocol.
Black-box proof.
We now have all the ingredients to describe how we obtain a proof phase which is size-hiding and completely black-box.
Recall that in the proof phase, V sends queries q1, . . . , q d , one for each possible depth of the real tree. The prover is expected to prepare paths for each query, even for those that are outside the real tree, and prove that paths are consistent and that predicate φ is true for the query hitting the committed depth. For queries outside the real tree P computes fake paths for which it is not required to honestly prove consistency. In the non-black-box protocol, fake paths were just a sequence of zeros. This was enough because paths were never opened.
In our case, we will need the prover to partially open each node of the path, so that the verifier can directly check the hash consistency of each node. Therefore here the prover has to compute fake paths that still look consistent with the real tree. We are able to prepare such paths by exploiting the soft connection in our extendable Merkle tree.
Our black-box proof phase proceeds as follows. P prepares paths. For each query qj, P retrieves the nodes along the path between qj and the root. If qj is below the real tree, P will just add fake nodes from a virtual leaf in position qj up to the first node hitting the real tree, in a way that hash consistency is preserved. P commits to the paths so constructed. Proof. For the path for query qj, P prepares the following proofs: path consistency, for each node of the path, P computes MPC-in using the trapdoor condition iff j > s; predicate: for the leaf qj, P runs an MPC-in-the-head on top of VSS q j and VSS depth , to prove that: either φ(Recon(VSS q j )) = 1 and j = Recon(VSS depth ), or j = Recon(VSS depth ). We denote this MPC as MPC-φ. Verification. In order to verify the proof, V sends t positions p1, . . . , pt to P . For each node, P reveals the views in such positions. V is then able to verify hash consistency, node consistency and the predicate condition. The details of the proof phase are illustrated in Fig. 3 .
Our size-hiding black-box commit-and-prove protocol is shown in Fig. 2 (Commitment) and Fig. 3 (Proof) . For simplicity of exposition we have shown a construction that works with a single query qj for each level of the virtual tree. The same protocol can be easily adapted to work with a set Ij = {qj1, . . . , q jk } of positions. The commitment scheme SHCom used in the protocol must be statistically-hiding, as it is also secure under selective opening attacks (under the indistinguishability definition [20] ).
Observations. In the commitment stage of our protocol, P commits to the string s by committing to the root of the extendable Merkle tree, and to the depth s, by committing to the VSS representation of s. The depth is used as trapdoor condition. In the proof phase P is actually proving a predicate about both s and s.
This approach can be generalized further. P can commit to several strings, committing either to their VSS representation (in case the size can be revealed) or to the root of an extendable Merkle tree. Then it can prove arbitrary relations among such strings just by setting the condition to be checked in protocols MPC-in and MPC-φ accordingly. We use this ability of proving statements over multiple strings committed using either VSS or extendable merkle tree in our public-coin ZK protocol.
APPLICATIONS

Black-Box WIUARG
A WIUARG for a language LU can be seen as a commitand-prove protocol: the prover P commits to a PCP proof π, the PCP verifier V challenges P with the positions computed via Qpcp, and P proves that Dpcp on such positions outputs 1.
More formally, the predicate proved by P is denoted by φ-Dpcp(y, ·) and is defined over instances y ∈ LU and a set of indexes I, and it is true iff Dpcp(y, {πi}i∈I ) = 1. The details of the construction are shown in Prot. 1. The commitment scheme used in Prot. 1 is an extractable SH commitment scheme (instead of just SH). This is required to obtain the weak-proof-of-knowledge property.
Commitment of the PCP.
1. P runs M on input (w, x). Let t = TM (x, w).
Let w = (w, t ) such that (y, w ) ∈ R U . P invokes Ppcp on input (y, w ) and obtains the proof π.
2. P runs BBCom(π) (Fig. 2) to commit to π.
Queries. V sends random tapes r1, . . . , r d to P . P and
. They obtain queries {I1, . . . , I d }. Case j = s: queries hitting the real depth.
Retrieve the real path from the root to leaf q s . For each node, compute MPC-in proving that innode property is satisfied. For the leaf q s , compute MPC-φ to prove that φ(Recon(VSS q s ) = 1) and Recon(VSS depth ) = j.
Case j < s: queries lying on the real depth.
Retrieve the path from the real tree, from the root to leaf q l . Compute proof of consistency and proof of predicate using the trapdoor condition Recon(VSS depth ) = j.
Commitment of the paths. For γ = q1, . . . , q d , P has obtained paths:
and MPC-φ γ . P commits to each node by committing to each view separately and hash value separately via SHCom.
Verification
V sends to P randomly selected positions p1, . . . , pt.
P opens views corresponding to players in position p1, . . . , pt for all the commitments above. Proof. P runs BBProve(φ-Dpcp, {I1, . . . , I d }) (Fig. 3) . V accepts iff the verifier of BBProve accepts.
Black-box Constant-Round Public-Coin Zero Knowledge
We provide a black-box implementation of Barak's zeroknowledge protocol by extending our commit-and-prove protocol.
In the first stage of Barak's protocol, P starts by sending a commitment z, that is supposed to be a commitment of a machine M predicting the next message function of the verifier. The size of M cannot be upper bounded by any fixed polynomial, as one has to include any possible polynomial time machine. Therefore commitment z is computed using our size-hiding commitment of Fig. 2 . The honest prover simply commit to the string 0 n . Next, V sends a random string r. This concludes the trapdoor generation phase, and defines the trapdoor theorem (M, r): "M is a TM that predicts r in at most t steps", which will be proved using PCP of Proximity. Here M is the private theorem, and r is the public theorem.
In the second phase, P has to prove that either the trapdoor theorem is true or x ∈ L. It sends two commitments: a commitment to a string which is supposed to be a PCPP proof π for the trapdoor theorem, and a commitment to the witness for theorem "x ∈ L". The PCPP proof π is committed again via our size-hiding commitment stage (Fig. 2) . For the witness w, P commits to its VSS representation. We denote this commitment by VSSCom. This concludes the commitment stage of the commit-and-prove protocol.
The verifier then generates the queries for the oracles M, π by running algorithm Qpcpx on input the public theorem r. Qpcpx outputs indexes qi for private theorem M and indexes pi for the proof π.
We now use the full power of our novel black-box sizehiding commit-and-prove protocol. We define the predicate φ-ZK to be checked over the strings M, π, w, as follows: φ-ZK is true iff the decision algorithm Dpcpx, executed on the selected positions of M and π outputs 1, or if w is a valid witness for x ∈ L. Needless to say, P will not commit to a valid PCPP proof, and will cheat in every proof using the trapdoor x ∈ L.
The formal specification of the protocol follows. We use PCP of Proximity with proximity parameter δ, for the following pair language: LP = {(a = (r, t), (Y )), ∃M ∈ {0, 1} * s.t. Y ← ECC(M ), M (z) = r within t steps} (where ECC(·) is a binary error correcting code tolerating a constant fraction δ > 0 of errors).
Protocol 2. Black-Box Constant-Round Public-coin ZK Common Input: x. Auxiliary Input to P : w such that (x, w) ∈ RL.
Trapdoor-generation phase.
• P runs BBCom(0 n ) with V . Let z be the commitment so obtained.
• V sends a random value r ∈ {0, 1} n to P . The public theorem a is defined as: a = (r, t).
Proof phase.
• Commitment of the PCPP. P runs BBCom(0 n ) and VSSCom(w) and sends the commitments to V .
• PCPP Queries. V sends random tapes r1, . . . , r d to P . P and V compute (q • Proof. P runs BBProve(φ-ZK,I
M , I π ). V accepts iff the verifier of BBProve accepts.
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